In a recent article in this Journal, Fumagalli (2011) argues that economists are provisionally justified in resisting prominent calls to integrate neural variables into economic models of choice. In other articles, various authors engage with Fumagalli's argument and try to substantiate three often-made claims concerning neuroeconomic modelling. First, the benefits derivable from neurally informing some economic models of choice do not involve significant tractability costs. Second, neuroeconomic modelling is best understood within Marr's three-level of analysis framework for information-processing systems. And third, neural findings enable choice modellers to confirm the causal relevance of variables posited by competing economic models, identify causally relevant variables overlooked by existing models, and explain observed behavioural variability better than standard economic models. In this paper, I critically examine these three claims and respond to the related criticisms of Fumagalli's argument. Moreover, I qualify and extend Fumagalli's account of how trade-offs between distinct modelling desiderata hamper neuroeconomists' attempts to improve economic models of choice. I then draw on influential neuroeconomic studies to argue that even the putatively best available neural findings fail to substantiate current calls for a neural enrichment of economic models.
Introduction
The proponents of neuroeconomics (henceforth, NE) frequently advocate integrating neural variables into economic models of choice (see e.g. Camerer, 2008 , Glimcher, 2010 , ch.12-15, and Loewenstein et al., 2008 . In their view, this integration enables economists to discriminate between competing models of choice and build more predictive and explanatory models. In a recent article in this Journal, Fumagalli (2011) argues that these calls for a neural enrichment of economic models (henceforth, NEEM) face pressing pragmatic and epistemic challenges. In particular, he articulates a 'refined argument from tractability' to demonstrate that economists are provisionally justified in resisting neuroeconomists' (henceforth, NEs) calls for NEEM. Fumagalli's argument builds on the trade-offs between the modelling desiderata valued by NEs (e.g. fit with the available neural findings) and by other economists (e.g. tractability) respectively. The idea is that these desiderata make dissimilar demands on modellers and that these trade-offs, in turn, hamper NEs' attempts to improve economic models of choice. 1 In other articles, various authors engage with Fumagalli's argument and try to substantiate three often-made claims concerning NE modelling. First, "for at least some economic model of choice behaviour, the benefits derivable from neurally informing [this] economic model do not involve special tractability costs" (Colombo, 2015, 713 ; see also Camerer, 2008, and Loewenstein et al., 2008) . Second, NE modelling "is best understood within Marr's three-level of analysis framework" for informationprocessing systems (Colombo, 2015, 713 ; see also Glimcher, 2003, and Kable and Glimcher, 2009) . And third, neural findings enable choice modellers to confirm the causal relevance of variables posited by competing economic models, identify causally relevant variables overlooked by existing models, and explain observed behavioural variability better than standard economic models (Colombo, 2015, 715-7;  see also Fehr and Rangel, 2011 , Quartz, 2008 , and Rustichini, 2009 . Let us call these three claims tractability thesis, Marr thesis and relevance thesis respectively.
In this paper, I critically examine these three theses and respond to the related criticisms of Fumagalli's (2011) argument. Moreover, I qualify and extend Fumagalli's account of how trade-offs between distinct modelling desiderata hamper NEs' attempts to improve economic models. I then argue that in spite of recent integrative advances at the interface between NE's parent disciplines, the proponents of NE have failed to substantiate their calls for NEEM. The contents are organized as follows.
In Section 2, I examine the tractability thesis and argue that it fails to address the challenge that Fumagalli's refined argument from tractability poses to the proponents of NEEM. In Section 3, I focus on the Marr thesis and argue that it stands in tension with important tenets of Marr's (1982) framework and is vulnerable to hitherto unaddressed objections. In Section 4, I draw on a useful analytical framework put forward by Bernheim (2009) and Dean (2013) to assess the relevance of NE findings for the economic modelling of choice. In particular, I inspect influential NE studies of the neural substrates of risk-sensitive choice that have been claimed to inform economic modelling in all the three respects indicated by the relevance thesis. I then argue that even these selected NE contributions lack the evidential and explanatory relevance for economic modelling required to substantiate the proffered calls for NEEM. My critical appraisal does not exclude the possibility that neural findings can provide economists with an additional source of evidence to assess existing models (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009, and Kuorikoski and Marchionni, 2016) and develop novel models of choice (see e.g. Dean, 2013, and . Still, it makes it pressing for the proponents of NEEM to put forward more convincing reasons and evidence to support their calls to incorporate neural variables into economic models of choice.
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Before proceeding, three preliminary caveats are in order. First, in this paper I focus on neural -rather than biological -variables since recent progress in neuroscience is especially relevant for assessing the proffered calls for NEEM. However, I shall speak of neural variables broadly to include neuro-biological variables into this category. Moreover, I shall refer in various places to the literature on modelling in neuro-biology, highlighting some parallel concerns regarding the integration of neural and biological variables into economic models (see e.g. Matthewson and Weisberg, 2009 , on the existence and significance of trade-offs between distinct modelling desiderata; see also Boone and Piccinini, 2016 , on the relevance of tractability considerations for economic and neuro-biological modelling). Second, in the NE literature various authors advocate claims that resemble the tractability thesis, the Marr thesis and the relevance thesis. Below I devote particular attention to Colombo (2015) because this article directly engages with Fumagalli's challenges and offers a commendably clear formulation of these theses. Still, as I illustrate in Sections 2-4, my remarks also bear on other prominent calls for such theses. In this perspective, Colombo's article can be seen as an interesting test case that nicely exemplifies the severity of the evidential and explanatory challenges faced by the proponents of NEEM.
Finally, my aim is not merely to provide a critical response to the proponents of NEEM, but also to advance the ongoing philosophical debate about the prospects of the interdisciplinary modelling of choice (see e.g. Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010 , Ross, 2008 , Vromen, 2007 , and Weisberg, 2007a and 2007b . More specifically, I aim to advance this debate in three respects of general interest to scientific modellers and philosophers of science, namely: identify some major divergences in the methodological presuppositions and the explanatory goals of choice modellers across distinct decision sciences; clarify these divergences' implications for the relevance of neural findings for the economic modelling of choice; and explicate the most pressing evidential and explanatory challenges that hinder interdisciplinary integration at the interface between economics, psychology and neuro-biology.
The Tractability Thesis and Modelling Trade-offs
The tractability thesis states that "for at least some economic model of choice, the benefits derivable from neurally informing [this] economic model do not involve special tractability costs", i.e. tractability costs that "are too high and specifically due to neurally informing [such] model" (Colombo, 2015, 713 and 716; see also Camerer, 2008) . The notion of tractability has been characterized in several ways by choice modellers. For instance, Fumagalli (2011, 621) takes the number of variables appearing in a model as "an approximate indicator of its tractability" that provides "a convenient rule of thumb for comparing alternative modelling frameworks" (2011, 622; see also Kahneman, 2003) . For his part, Colombo contends that complexity theory, which characterizes a model's tractability in terms of "the time a Turing machine needs for [finding a solution to] the model", provides a more 'reliable' indicator of tractability than the indicator used by Fumagalli (2015, 726) . I am not persuaded by Colombo's contention regarding these two indicators of tractability (see e.g. Hindriks, 2006 , on various differences between economists' and computer scientists' use of 'tractability'; see also Boone and Piccinini, 2016 , on the contrast between solvability and tractability in neurocomputational modelling). In particular, I fail to see why exactly the modelling costs involved in NEEM should be assessed in terms of Colombo's complexity theory indicator of tractability as opposed to other indicators of tractability. Still, below I gloss over this definitional concern since my main challenge to the tractability thesis holds irrespective of whether one adopts Fumagalli's or Colombo's indicator of tractability. Let me expand on this challenge.
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In articulating his argument, Fumagalli (2011, 627) acknowledges that the workings of the human neural architecture can be occasionally modelled without using many neural variables (see e.g. Schultz et al., 1997 , on the dopaminergic underpinnings of basic reward valuation tasks). In his view, constructing descriptively accurate and neurally informed economic models of choice does not always require NEs to represent the neural substrates of choice down to their tiniest details (e.g. size and number of ion channels, number and strength of synaptic connections). However, when it comes to modelling the wide range of decision problems targeted by economists (e.g. choosing between heterogeneous multi-attribute financial portfolios, choosing between alternative careers), "accurately representing the neural substrates of choice […] would typically impose significant tractability costs" (Fumagalli, 2011, 628 , italics added). Fumagalli bolsters this typicality claim with two often-made observations. First, several neural areas that contribute to decision making "activate in a wide range of decision contexts" (ibid., 628; see also Bernheim, 2009, and Weiskopf, 2016) . And second, "even the execution of simple experimental tasks typically engages several areas, with additional variability resulting when it comes to solving decision problems" (Fumagalli, 2011, 628 ; see also Muldoon and Bassett, 2016, and Vromen, 2010a) .
According to Colombo (2015, 722) 
The Marr Thesis and the Goals of NE
According to the Marr thesis, NE modelling "is best understood within Marr's three-level of analysis framework" for information-processing systems (Colombo, 2015, 713) . Marr (1982, 20-29) posits the following tripartition between the computational, algorithmic and physical implementation levels of analysis of information-processing systems (e.g. the visual system). Computational analyses aim to specify what information-processing problems are faced by the examined system in terms of specific input-output mappings. Algorithmic analyses explicate how inputs and outputs are represented, and what algorithms putatively transform the system's inputs into the observed outputs. Finally, physical implementation analyses aim to identify what physical substrates implement the system's representations and algorithmic operations. 6 Various leading NEs (e.g. Glimcher, 2003, ch.6-8, and Kable and Glimcher, 2009 ) take Marr's framework to provide a plausible way to understand NEs' contributions to the interdisciplinary modelling of choice. The idea is that economic models at the computational level target "the kinds of functions that can be optimized by a given type of behaviour", NE models at the algorithmic level identify "the processes by which that behaviour can be carried out", and neuro-biological models at the physical implementation level target "the neural structures and activities that implement a given algorithm" (Colombo, 2015, 729) . Suppose, for the sake of argument, that NE modelling can be plausibly understood within Marr's framework along these lines (see e.g. Dean, 2013) . This falls short of licensing the stronger 'Marr thesis' that NE modelling "is best understood" within such framework (Colombo, 2015, 713) . Moreover, as I argue below, the 'Marr thesis' stands in profound tension with Marr's own emphasis on the formal independence of distinct levels of analysis. This, in turn, casts doubt on the alleged superiority of a Marrian conceptualization of NE modelling over other conceptualizations.
According to Marr (1982, ch.1 ; see also Marr et al., 1979) , performing informative analyses of information-processing systems requires one to identify precisely what information-processing problems are faced by such systems. As documented by subsequent studies, severe difficulties plague attempts to identify such problems (see e.g. Anderson, 2015, and Warren, 2012 , on Marr's attempts to identify the information-processing problems faced by the visual system). This identification task is even more difficult when it comes to extending Marr's analysis of basic visual perception tasks to other cognitive activities (see e.g. Shagrir and Bechtel, 2015 , on episodic memory) and the decision problems targeted by economists (see e.g. Harrison, 2008 , on choices involving multiple computational goals simultaneously). These identification problems, combined with the fact that many different algorithms can solve specific computational problems and many different neural substrates can implement the investigated algorithms (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009 ; see also Marr, 1982, ch.1) , make it hard to see why exactly NE modelling would be 'best understood' within Marr's framework.
To be fair, NEs may alleviate some of these identification and underdetermination problems by triangulating findings from different levels of analysis (see e.g. Kuorikoski and Marchionni, 2016, and Quartz, 2008 , on how neural and algorithmic findings may constrain computational theories). Yet, the point remains that according to Marr "the three levels are only rather loosely related", so that several phenomena "may be [modelled and] explained at only one or two of them" (1982, 25 ; see also Kaplan, 2011) . Indeed, Marr adamantly insists that "from an information-processing point of view [it is] the level of computational theory, which is critically important" (ibid., 27) and that "computational theory [is] independent of the algorithm or implementation levels" (ibid., 337; see also Craver and Alexandrova, 2008) . These remarks do not imply that decision problems are best modelled independently at the computational, algorithmic and physical implementation levels (see e.g. Boone and Piccinini, 2016) . Still, they cast doubt on the thesis that NE interdisciplinary modelling is 'best understood' within Marr's framework. In particular, they challenge the proponents of this thesis to specify which tenets of Marr's framework substantiate such a thesis.
These considerations, in turn, have critical implications for the alleged superiority of a Marrian conceptualization of NE research over different conceptualizations. To see this, consider Colombo's claim that "once it is clear that the relevant notion of a level used in [NE modelling] is Marr's one", then it becomes evident that "asking whether 'human choice behaviour is more conveniently modelled at the neural -rather than some other -level' is a misunderstanding of [NE] methodology" (2015, 729, italics added). This claim invites the following two-fold rejoinder. First, it is highly doubtful that one single notion of level is 'the relevant' notion of level in NE modelling in general. For different notions of level may be relevant in different modelling contexts, depending on factors such as modellers' pragmatic purposes and the epistemic interests of their target audiences (see e.g. Craver, 2005 , and Mäki, 2009 . And second, the hitherto proffered claims that 'the relevant' notion of level in NE modelling is Marr's one fall short of implying that asking whether human choice behaviour is more conveniently modelled at the neural -rather than some other -level is a misunderstanding of NE. For one may consistently use the term 'level' to indicate both distinct scientific disciplines and different levels of analysis in Marr's sense. In fact, several leading NEs use the term 'level' in both senses when presenting and discussing their findings. For instance, Glimcher advocates a Marrian conceptualization of NE modelling, yet repeatedly speaks of 'levels' with reference to scientific disciplines (see e.g. 2003, ch.6-8, and 2010, ch.2) . In particular, he holds that "the goal of [NE] is to produce a single unified model of human decision making that spans the economic, psychological, and neuroscientific levels of analysis" (2010, 4).
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These pluralistic remarks about NE modelling also hold for prominent characterizations of the goals of NE. To see this, consider Colombo's contention that "all characterizations [agree that] the goal of [NE] is an algorithmic description of the human mechanism for choice" (2015, 728) . This contention fits prominent characterizations of the goals of NE (see e.g. Glimcher, 2010, ch.8) . However, it seemingly overlooks that not all entrenched approaches to NE research aim to provide an algorithmic description of the human mechanism for choice (see e.g. Ross, 2008 , on so-called behavioural economics in the scanner; see also Montague, 2007 , on two 'natural neuroeconomics', which respectively investigate algorithms and the efficient operation of neural tissue). Furthermore, several authors privilege other levels of analysis over the algorithmic one in their characterizations of NE modelling (see e.g. Rangel et al., 2008, 545 , for the claim that "it is the computations that are central to uniting
[distinct] levels"). These observations do not exclude the possibility that various NE studies may be regarded as attempts to identify "indirect ways of ultimately getting at [algorithms]" (Colombo, personal correspondence). Still, they cast doubt on the claim that providing an algorithmic description of the human mechanism for choice is 'the' (or even 'the main') goal of NE. To put it differently, reiterating that "all characterizations" of NE agree that "the goal of [NE] is an algorithmic description of the human mechanism for choice" provides a simplistic portrayal of NE that fails to fit the diverse goals of NE.
The Relevance Thesis and the Economic Modelling of Choice
According to the relevance thesis, neural findings enable choice modellers to confirm the causal relevance of variables posited by competing economic models, identify causally relevant variables overlooked by existing models, and explain observed behavioural variability better than standard economic models (Colombo, 2015, 715-7 ; see also Fehr and Rangel, 2011 , Quartz, 2008 , and Rustichini, 2009 , for similar claims). In this section, I assess whether neural findings inform economic modelling in these three respects, focusing on some of the putatively best available NE studies. More specifically, I consider an influential NE study Colombo takes to exemplify "how results from cognitive neuroscience can be used to inform economic models of choice" (2015, 722), namely Niv et al.'s (2012) work on the neural substrates of risk-sensitive choice. This study constitutes an ideal test case for assessing NEs' contributions, since it purportedly "completes a full circle starting from computational theory, through the psychology [and] the neural basis [of choice] and back again to influence and inform the computational theory" (Niv et al., 2012, 561) .
Experimental Setting and Main Findings
Niv et al. scan sixteen human subjects with fMRI to examine the neural substrates of risk-sensitive choice. These subjects earn monetary rewards by choosing between different stimuli. Some of these stimuli are associated with fixed payoffs, whereas the others are associated with a 50% probability of receiving specified payoffs (both the fixed and the risky stimuli are associated with payoffs in the 0¢-40¢ range). Subjects have to learn the payoffs of different stimuli through the experiment. More formally, in the standard TD model a reward prediction error
is computed at each of two consecutive time steps t stimulus and t outcome = t stimulus + 1, where V(t) is the predicted value of a given stimulus at time t, and r(t) is the reward at time t. The reward prediction error at t outcome is used to update V(C), the value of the chosen stimulus, according to V new (C) = V old (C) + η δ(t outcome ), with η being a learning rate parameter. What Niv et al. call utility model has the same update rule as the standard TD model, but has a different reward prediction error, namely: All these three models assume that subjects use past experience to estimate the expected payoffs associated with different stimuli and, given a choice, pick between stimuli based on these stimuli's expected values. However, those models yield dissimilar predictions about subjects' behaviour in situations of risk and make different claims about the neural substrates of risk-sensitive choice. More specifically, risk aversion "arises implicitly" in the standard TD model because "risky stimuli are, by definition, associated with outcomes that are larger or smaller than their means", so that "learned predictive values […] fluctuate above and below the mean according to the specific sequence of past experienced rewards" (Niv et al., 2012, 555) . In the so-called utility model, instead, risksensitive preferences "emerge because the two options that have objectively been designated as having the same mean payoff do not lead to an equal subjective mean reward" (ibid., 556). Again differently, in the RSTD model risk sensitivity arises because positive and negative prediction errors have asymmetric effects on learning. In the words of Niv et al., "if negative errors have the effect of decreasing [the updated value of the chosen stimulus] more than positive errors increase it, then the learned value will be lower than the mean nominal outcome, leading to risk aversion. Conversely, higher learning rates for positive compared to negative prediction errors will [lead to] overestimation of the values of risky options and thus to risk seeking" (ibid., 556). Niv et al. (2012, 556-7) compare the 'posterior likelihoods' of each subject's choice data according to each of the three models, and find that the RSTD model fits the behavioural data better than the other two models almost for every subject. They then compare the three models' predictions to neural measurements of the learned values of the stimuli and, again, find that the RSTD model fits the neural data better than the other two models. In their view, these findings indicate that risk sensitivity "is indeed present in prediction error signaling in the nucleus accumbens, with a direct correlation between the risk-averse or risk-seeking choices of [experimental] subjects and the neural prediction error signals" (2012, 561). These findings, in turn, allegedly suggest that risk sensitivity "as in RSTD learning, should be imported into computational models of human choice" (ibid., 561).
Evaluation
Niv et al.'s findings have been claimed to inform the economic modelling of choice in all the three respects indicated by the relevance thesis. More specifically, these findings putatively: (1) "confirm (or disconfirm) the causal relevance of latent, subjective variables or processes posited by competing [economic] models of choice" (Colombo, 2015, 715 ; see also Niv et al., 2012, 551) ; (2) "point to causally relevant variables or processes overlooked by existing models" (Colombo, 2015, 715 ; see also Niv et al., 2012, 551) ; and (3) "explain [observed] behavioral variability both computationally and neurally, by contrasting three possible explanations for risk-sensitive choice" (Niv et al., 2012, 555 ; see also Colombo, 2015, 717) . Below I draw on a useful analytical framework put forward by Bernheim (2009) and Dean (2013) to examine these three purported contributions in sequence. I shall argue that Niv et al.'s study improves over former NE works on risk-sensitive choice (e.g. Hsu et al., 2009 ) by clearly specifying in what respects neural findings supposedly inform the economic modelling of choice. Still, even this selected study lacks the evidential and explanatory relevance for economic modelling required to substantiate the proffered calls for NEEM.
Confirming the causal relevance of latent variables
According to Colombo, "the main benefit" of Niv et al.'s study for economic modellers consists in "a kind of independent test of competing models of risk-sensitive choice" (2015, 717, italics added). The analytical framework put forward by Bernheim (2009) and Dean (2013) provides a helpful basis for explicating and assessing this alleged contribution. This framework conceptualizes the economic modelling of choice as an attempt to identify how an individual's choices are causally influenced by a set of conditions that the individual regards as fixed (or at least predetermined). The framework takes economic modellers to assume that some function f: y = f (x, ω) maps a set of observed explanatory variables x (e.g. prices) and a set of unobserved environmental variables ω (e.g. neural activations) on the set of choices y. Standard economic models make no explicit assumptions about the neuro-biological substrates of choice and treat the unobserved environmental variables as noise. For their part, NEs regard standard economic models as a reduced form for the underlying neuro-biological processes. More formally, NEs assume that neural activations z depend on both observed and unobserved variables through a function Z: z = Z (x, ω), with the individual's choices resulting from a function Y: y = Y (z, x, ω). NEs then build on observed neural activations and choices to disclose both function Z and function Y, thereby helping economic modellers to identify the mapping f (x, ω) = Y (Z(x, ω), x, ω). Second, severe limitations affect current attempts to rely on temporal difference reinforcement learning models to demonstrate that one functional form provides the uniquely best fit with observed choices across the real-life choice settings targeted by economists. To be sure, temporal difference reinforcement learning models may guide the formulation of empirical hypotheses about behavioral relationships, possibly leading economists to examine novel specifications in choice settings (like the one targeted by Niv et al.) involving the accumulation of experience (see e.g. Caplin and Dean, 2008a ). Yet, when it comes to the real-life choice settings targeted by economists, studies focused solely on temporal difference reinforcement learning models lack the potential to demonstrate that one functional form robustly fits observed choices better than other functional forms. For several learning processes besides temporal difference reinforcement learning often influence choices in such choice settings (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009, and .
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And third, inferences about risk attitudes have been shown to vary remarkably depending on whether the latent data generating process is viewed through the lens of one, two or more models (see e.g. Harrison and Rutström, 2008 , for detailed illustrations). Moreover, economists have developed various statistical tools to estimate the probability that multiple latent data generating processes generate the observed choices (see e.g. Harrison and Rutström, 2009 -model" (2015, 722) .
A proponent of NEEM may object that Niv et al.'s findings are evidentially and explanatorily relevant for economic modelling on the alleged ground that they target phenomena modelled by economists, namely observed choices. Economics has often been characterized as a 'science of choice' during its history (see e.g. Robbins, [1932 ] 1945 , and Weber, [1904 1949, for famous characterizations of economics as a science that studies human choice behaviour in presence of scarce means having alternative uses). Yet, the mere fact that some findings target phenomena modelled by economists falls short of implying that these findings are evidentially and explanatorily relevant for the economic modelling of choice. To see this, suppose that a particle physicist provided a set of statistically significant correlations between an individual's purchase decisions and the micro-physical bodily movements the individual implements in performing such decisions. The correlations provided by the particle physicist target a phenomenon modelled by economists. This, however, by no means implies that these correlations are evidentially and explanatorily relevant for the economic modelling of choice. In fact, those correlations seem largely orthogonal to economists' evidential and explanatory concerns (see Bernheim, 2009 , sec.1, for similar remarks about NEs' correlations between observed choices and endogenous brain activity).
A proponent of NEEM may further object that NEs could in principle redefine entrenched criteria for demarcating the set of economic models so as to imply that any finding targeting observed choices is ipso facto evidentially and explanatorily relevant for economic modelling. This redefinition, however, would trivialize the putative significance of the claim that neural findings are evidentially and explanatorily relevant for economic modelling. For under such redefinition, findings from all sorts of disciplines -ranging from social anthropology to particle physicswould be evidentially and explanatorily relevant for economic modelling. This does not vindicate isolationist characterizations of economics' domain that aprioristically exclude latent neuro-biological variables from such domain (see e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008) . Still, it challenges NEs to provide more nuanced criteria for demarcating the set of economic models and assessing the relevance of neural findings for the economic modelling of choice. As Ross puts it, "imagine a model that features a consumption […] variable on its left-hand side and nothing but neurological variables on its right-hand side. This would strike almost all economists […] as not being an economic model" (2011, 218).
Pointing to new relevant variables
According to Colombo, Niv et al.'s findings "point to causally relevant variables or processes overlooked by existing models" (2015, 715, italics added). In his view, these findings help choice modellers to ascertain whether traditional reinforcement learning models (e.g. Sutton and Barto, 1998) Fumagalli, 2016b, and Vromen, 2010b) . Paraphrasing Dean, economists recognize that neuro-biological processes mediate the influence of the variables they target (e.g. prices) on choices, yet neuro-biological processes "represent neither the environmental [variables] nor the behavioral outcomes [targeted by economists]" (2013, 167).
To be fair, NEs' findings could in principle prompt economists to build their models on neuro-biological presuppositions (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009 ) and include neuro-biological variables into their models (see e.g. Caplin and Dean, 2015 Fumagalli, 2016c, and Ross, 2009 , for several examples).
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More generally, the point remains that identifying and measuring variables that causally influence individuals' choices does not per se imply that economists should include these variables into their models. My point is not just that individuals' choices are causally influenced by a panoply of variables that few economic modellers would include into their models (e.g. the amount of solar radiation to which individuals are exposed, how many red blood cells are present in their circulatory systems). Rather, my main concern is that activations in the neural areas targeted by leading NE models of learning are immediate precursors to choices (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2013) and that observing these activations does not significantly improve economists' measurement of the causal relationship between standard exogenous environmental variables and choices (see e.g. Krajbich and Dean, 2015) . Furthermore, markets and other information-processing scaffolding innovations can demonstrably lead individuals who drastically differ in their neuro-biological makeup to instantiate observationally equivalent choice patterns (see Ross, 2014b, for illustrations) . These considerations do not preclude NEs from identifying increasingly fine-grained associations between observed choice patterns and specific neuro-biological variables (see e.g. Li et al. 2013, and Van den Bos et al., 2014 , on some neural measures of structural and functional connectivity). Still, they challenge the proponents of NEEM to support their calls to incorporate neural variables with more convincing reasons and evidence than the claim that neural findings "point to causally relevant variables or processes overlooked by existing models" (Colombo, 2015, 715 Craver, 2006 , Kaplan, 2011 Fumagalli, 2014) . Due to these differences, the mere fact that NEs are gaining more detailed understanding of the neuro-biological mechanisms underlying choices by no means implies that economists should explain choices in terms of such mechanisms (see e.g. Dietrich and List, 2016) . To put it differently, showing that some findings are explanatory for NEs falls short of indicating that such findings are explanatory for other economists.
A proponent of NEEM may further object that "in economics as well as in philosophy of economics, there is little agreement on what precisely constitutes an adequate explanation of [choices]" (Colombo, 2015, 717) . In particular, she may point out that some leading economists use 'explanation' as a synonym for descriptive fit with data (see e.g. Friedman, 1953, 8-9 Niv et al. (2012, 555) . Moreover, risk sensitivity was formerly shown to be incompatible with nonlinear utility in the domain of small payoffs targeted by Niv et al. (see e.g. Rabin and Thaler, 2001 ).
In fact, as Niv et al. (2012, 560) cursorily acknowledge, their findings do not even shed light on whether the asymmetric effect that positive and negative prediction errors putatively have on subjects' predictions is fixed or varies depending on factors such as subjects' amount of training, payoff variations beyond the 0¢-40¢ range, and the degree of risk involved in the examined task. These limitations, in turn, severely constrain the evidential and explanatory relevance of Niv et al.'s findings for the modelling of the real-life decision problems targeted by economists. For all the mentioned factors have been shown to influence experimentally elicited individuals' risk attitudes (see e.g. Harrison and List, 2004 , on subjects' amount of training, Andersen et al., 2008, on payoff variations, and Harrison and Rutström, 2008, sec.3 , on the degree of risk involved in the examined task; see also Harrison et al., 2015 , for an updated review). That is to say, the proponents of NEEM have to meet much more stringent standards of experimental rigor and sophistication if they are to substantiate their calls to incorporate neural variables into economic models of choice.
Conclusion
In recent years, promising integrative advances have been made at the interface between economics, psychology and neuro-biology. In light of these advances, it would be implausible to reiterate that most NEs "are in the dark" about how their research "will reshape economics" (Rubinstein, 2008, 486-7) and are "a far cry from [providing] integrated neural and economic models" (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2009, 44) . Still, the proffered calls for NEEM face pressing and hitherto unaddressed evidential and explanatory challenges. In this paper, I articulated and defended three such challenges, which respectively target the modelling trade-offs involved in NE models (tractability thesis), entrenched conceptualizations of NE modelling (Marr thesis) , and the relevance of neural findings for the economic modelling of choice (relevance thesis). My three challenges do not exclude the possibility that neural findings can provide economists with an additional source of evidence to assess existing models and develop novel models of choice. Still, they make it pressing for the proponents of NEEM to put forward more convincing reasons and evidence to support their calls to incorporate neural variables into economic models of choice.
9 This does not exclude that one may capture nonparametrically the testable implications of choice models that contain latent variables. In fact, leading economists have already applied rigorous axiomatic approaches to test reward prediction error (RPE) models of the same class as those compared by Niv et al. For instance, Caplin and Dean (2008b) use an axiomatic approach to test RPE models with neuro-biological data and identify three axiomatic conditions that characterize the entire class of RPE models in a simple, nonparametric way. These axiomatic conditions yield a minimal requirement for RPE models in the sense that if neural activity is to satisfy any one of the class of RPE models, then such activity must also satisfy those axiomatic conditions (Caplin et al., 2010) . 10 A proponent of NEEM might conjecture that the "heterogeneity of risk attitudes at extended timescales might […] be partly explained by people's varying levels of short-timescale […] risk sensitivity" (Colombo, 2015, 726) . This conjecture highlights the potential of neural findings to shed light on the neural substrates of intertemporal behavioural patterns. However, due to the limitations constraining the evidential and explanatory relevance of current neural findings for the modelling of the real-life decision problems targeted by economists (see point 4.2.3 below), such conjecture does not presently support the claim that economists should build their models of choice on neurobiological presuppositions and include neuro-biological variables into their models.
